基于非排它性互换合约的管理层激励研究

管理者进行金融衍生品市场的非排它性股权互换交易会降低报酬合约的事后激励强度,并对企业价值和风险产生影响.本文在管理者可同时影响企业风险和企业价值的条件下,构建基于股权互换避险交易的管理者激励薪酬动态博弈模型.结果表明,当管理者投入产出效率高于某临界值时,互换避险的存在不会降低激励合约的强度；否则激励合约强度的减弱程度随...

Incentive contract based on managerial hedging by non-exclusive equity swaps

Managerial hedging by non-exclusive equity swaps can reduce ex post incentive of the contract,and affect the firm value and risk thereafter.Under the assumption that the manager can affect both the firm value and firm risk simultaneously,we analyze dynamic game equilibrium of the incentive contract and non-exclusive equity swaps contract.The results indicate that when the efficiency of the manager's effort exceeds a key point,hedging will not reduce the incentive.Otherwise,the degree of reduced equilibrium ...