| 委托代理模型的扩展 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘玉勋,单禹.委托代理模型的扩展[J].肇庆学院学报,2011,32(6):28-32. |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘玉勋 单禹 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 广东肇庆学院经济与管理学院,广东肇庆,526061
2. 中央财经大学中国金融发展研究院,北京,100081 |
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| 基金项目： | 广东省自然科学基金项目(8152606101000010); 广东省普通高校人文社会科学“十一五”规划项目(06ZD79002) |
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| 摘 要： | 针对传统的委托代理模型不能解释股东是如何选择经理人的缺陷,对传统的委托代理模型进行扩展：提出代理人目标的多层次性,以此来解释只获得保留效用的代理人签约的动力来源;提出委托人的保留剩余约束,以此来反映委托人的参与约束;提出合作剩余概念,以此来反映形成委托代理关系的前提条件。运用扩展的委托代理模型可以发现,委托代理关系的形成本质上是合作剩余的分配过程,而不同的市场结构是影响合作剩余分配的主要因素。
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| 关 键 词： | 期望效用 期望报酬 保留效用 保留报酬 保留剩余 合作剩余 |
An Extension to the Principal-Agent Model |
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| LIU Yuxun,SHAN Yu.An Extension to the Principal-Agent Model[J].Journal of Zhaoqing University (Bimonthly),2011,32(6):28-32. |
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| Authors: | LIU Yuxun SHAN Yu |
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| Institution: | LIU Yuxun1,SHAN Yu2(1.School of Economy and management,Zhaoqing University,Zhaoqing,Guangdong,526061,China,2.China Central University of Finance,China Finacial Development & Research Institute,Beijing,100081,China) |
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| Abstract: | In view of the flaw that the traditional Principal-Agent model fails to explain how the shareholders choose their managers,the paper carries on an extension to the traditional principal-agent model and proposes the multi-level of agent goal so as to explain the power source of the agent signing only for reservation utility;The paper also puts forward the principal's reservation residue constraint to reflect the principal participation constraint;The cooperative residue concept is proposed to reflect the for... |
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| Keywords: | expected utility expected pay reservation utility reservation pay reservation residue cooperative residue |
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