信息不对称条件下激励相容的输配电价模型研究

政府与输配电企业之间存在着信息不对称，通过引入价格、输电量和转移支付三个政策工具，政府可以设计一套激励相容机制以诱使企业诚实申报成本。在激励相容机制基础上建立的输配电企业管制定价模型，不仅能维护消费者的利益，而且还能确保输配电企业不亏损。特别是当政府将输配电企业利润与消费者剩余视为同等重要时，输配电价将等于边际成本，资源将得到最优配置，此时输配电企业也将获得最大的利润。模型为我国输配电定价形成机制提供了理论与政策依据。

The Incentive Compatibility Price Model of Transmission and Distribution under Asymmetric Information

There is an asymmetric information between government and enterprise of transmission and distribution. However, government can design a set of incentive compatible mechanism to induce enterprise reporting cost honestly through introducing three policy instruments which are price, transmission capacity and transfer payment. The regulation pricing model of transmission and distribution enterprise based on incentive compatible mechanism not only safeguards the consumers' interests, but also ensures the transmission and distribution enterprise without losing. When the government regards the profit of transmission and distribution enterprise and the surplus of consumer as of equal importance, the price will be equal to marginal cost, and resources will be optimal configuration. At the same time, the enterprise will receive maximization profits. The model used in this paper provides theoretical and practical guidance for pricing mechanism of our transmission and distribution price.