Dualismus oder Reduktion – Eine Antwort auf Gregor Bongaerts

Gregor Bongaerts (2016b) has objected to my criticism of arguments in favor of a non-reductive sociology (both articles in this journal) and my proposal of a reductive individualism more generally. This contribution defends reductive individualism as a viable program in social theory. Bongaerts’s main objection, that I do not distinguish sufficiently between creation (Urheberschaft) and causation (Verursachung), can only be understood as an objection if one conceives the social sense of an action as an irreducible collective concept. Although this possibility cannot be excluded a priori, it poses a number of fundamental challenges. Firstly, it has to be asked whether or not this position can be connected with a realization proviso (that everything social is ultimately realized by individuals). Secondly, the attribution argument used by Bongaerts is either no objection to individualism, or it is threatened by a logical regress, since it is not plausible that subsequent interpretations of an action can produce the subjective meaning related to action. Finally, the question arises whether a collectivist argument does not require a collective bearer of meaning-attribution, the existence of which can hardly be asserted within the framework of a practice theory inspired by Bourdieu. The essay ends with some questions, especially with regard to the multi-dimensionality and unity of Bongaerts’s concept of meaning (Sinn).