| 高校后勤社会化企业监督激励机制的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 陈红兵.高校后勤社会化企业监督激励机制的博弈分析[J].西南大学学报(社会科学版),2002,28(6). |
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| 作者姓名： | 陈红兵 |
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| 作者单位： | 四川大学经济学院 四川成都610064 |
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| 摘 要： | 所有者 (学校 )与企业经营者拥有的信息不对称 ;(监督 ,{不作假 ,作假 } )是子博弈精炼纳什均衡 ;学校应该同时采取监督和激励来协调与经营者的目标。
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| 关 键 词： | 后勤社会化 监督激励机制 博弈 |
A Game Analyze to The Supervising and Inspiring System of The College's Enterprise |
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| CHEN Hong\|bing.A Game Analyze to The Supervising and Inspiring System of The College's Enterprise[J].Journal of Southwest University(Humanities and Social Sciences Edition),2002,28(6). |
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| Authors: | CHEN Hong\|bing |
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| Abstract: | The information which possessed by proprietary man (college) and enterprise manager is NOT symmetry; (supervise, {not making false, making false}) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium; the proprietary man (college) must use both supervising and inspiring in order to coordinate the objective between managers. |
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| Keywords: | Rear\|service marketwise supervising and inspiring system Game |
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