IMF的金融危机治理行为研究——基于经济学视角

借助于经济学分析框架,本文探究了金融危机国际治理首要主体——国际货币基金组织(IMF)分别作为自利行为者、有限理性行为者、受制度缺陷约束的行为者和资源有限的行为者的特性和危机治理行为。本文还进一步分析了IMF与其他的金融危机治理主体之间的关系:其与美国的关系是相互的代理人关系和仆人-主人关系;其与危机发生国家或地区的关系是治理资源与治理行动的不对等供求关系;其与区域性治理主体之间存在着互补和竞争的双重关系。以上关系也从不同侧面对IMF的危机治理行为有着重大影响。本文认为,改革IMF必须着眼于其本身特性与其内外部约束条件。

Inquiry into the Financial Crisis Mangement Behavior of the IMF:An Economic Analysis

The paper first explores,on the basis of a framwork of analysis in economics,the respective characteristics and financial crisis management behaviors of IMF as self-interested actor,limite rational actor,institution-flaw-constrained actor and insufficiently-resourced actor.Then the relations between IMF and other management entities of financial crisis are also discussed: the relation of being each other’s agent and servant-master relation between it and the USA;imbalanced supply-demand relation of management resources and actions between it and crisis-stricken countries and areas and complementary and competitive relation between it and regional managemont entities,all of which have great impacts on the management behavior of the IMF.Therefore,it is concluded that the IMF’s intrinsic characteristics and its internal and external constraints hit at the heart of the reform of the IMF.