首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      


COLLUSION IN PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS: AN EXPERIMENTAL EXAMINATION
Authors:Douglas D Davis  Bart J Wilson
Institution:Davis:;Professor, Dept. of Economics, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284-4000. E-mail Wilson:;Associate Professor, Dept. of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030. E-mail
Abstract:Experimental methods are used to examine the existence and detectability of collusion in environments that exhibit critical parallels to procurement auctions. We find that given the opportunity sellers often raise prices considerably. Moreover, noncollusive Nash equilibrium predictions are insufficient to dismiss "suspicious" behavior as innocuous: in an environment where identical prices are predicted in a noncollusive Nash equilibrium, common prices are observed only when sellers communicate. In a second environment designed to parallel construction procurement contracting, market rotations are observed both with and without collusion, but collusion can often be detected from the pattern of losing bids.
Keywords:
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号