| 基于博弈的美国上市公司盈余管理研究及启示 |
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| 引用本文： | 许跃辉.基于博弈的美国上市公司盈余管理研究及启示[J].河南科技大学学报(社会科学版),2005,23(2):77-80. |
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| 作者姓名： | 许跃辉 |
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| 作者单位： | 安徽经济管理学院,科研处,安徽,合肥,233051 |
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| 摘 要： | 美国上市公司的盈余管理是信息披露规范约束下的博弈行为,各方在各自利益的驱使下相互博弈,从而达到"纳什均衡"。博弈主体及其行为、博弈动机及博弈过程、静态"纳什均衡"博弈模型,可供我国上市公司盈余管理借鉴。
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| 关 键 词： | 美国 上市公司 盈余管理 |
| 文章编号： | 1672-3910(2005)02-0077-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年12月18 |
Earnings management of American listed companies based on games of chess |
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| XU Yue-hui.Earnings management of American listed companies based on games of chess[J].Journal of Henan University of Science & Technology:Social science,2005,23(2):77-80. |
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| Authors: | XU Yue-hui |
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| Abstract: | It is the game behavior under the norm restrains of information announcing that the surplus of the American listed company is managed, each player in the chess side driven by the each interest and plays chess each other to obtain Nash equilibrium. The game subject and behavior of surplus management of American listed company,the motive of surplus management of American listed company and game course and the static pattern about Nash equilibrium of earnings management can be used by listed companies of our country. |
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| Keywords: | U S A listed company earnings management |
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