| 中国内幕交易监管的效率--基于新政治经济学视角的分析 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 陈雨. 中国内幕交易监管的效率--基于新政治经济学视角的分析[J]. 厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2005, 57(6): 64-71 |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 陈雨 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 厦门大学,金融系,福建,厦门,361005 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社会科学研究项目(03JB79002). |
| |
| 摘 要： | 内幕交易监管效率在很大程度上受到一国的法律制度、政治制度以及金融制度的影响.构建一个利益集团间的竞争模型,可以用于分析内幕交易监管均衡的形成和均衡监管水平受利益集团成员规模变动的影响效应.从新政治经济学的视角考察,在本质上,内幕交易监管效率受制于外部人和内部人两个利益集团之间的力量对比以及监管者的效用偏好.这可以解释英美法系国家和大陆法系国家之间的内幕交易监管效率的差异,而我国内幕交易监管效率不高的原因也可从该角度得到很好的阐释.
|
| 关 键 词： | 内幕交易 内幕交易监管 证券监管 |
| 文章编号： | 0438-0460(2005)06-0064-08 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-05-19 |
The Efficiency of Insider Trading Surveillance A Perspective of New Political Economics |
| |
| CHEN Yu. The Efficiency of Insider Trading Surveillance A Perspective of New Political Economics[J]. Journal of Xiamen University(A Quarterly for Studies in Arts & Social Sciences), 2005, 57(6): 64-71 |
| |
| Authors: | CHEN Yu |
| |
| Abstract: | The efficiency of insider trading surveillance is,to a great degree,influenced by the a country's legal system,political system and financial system.From the perspective of new political economics,the competition model of interest group is constructed to analyze the formation of insider trading surveillance equilibrium and the influence effect of a change in the size of the interest groups.From the perspective of new political economics,the efficiency of insider trading surveillance is subject to the power contrast between two interest groups(one of the insider,one of the outsider) and the efficiency preference of the supervisor.This explains the difference of effect of insider trading surveillance between common law and civil law countries.And from this perspective it also explains why Chinese insider trading surveillance is not very efficient. |
| |
| Keywords: | insider trading insider trading surveillance securities surveillance |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
