| 基于公平偏好理论的激励机制与代理成本分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 袁茂,雷勇,蒲勇健. 基于公平偏好理论的激励机制与代理成本分析[J]. 管理工程学报, 2011, 25(2) |
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| 作者姓名： | 袁茂 雷勇 蒲勇健 |
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| 作者单位： | 袁茂,蒲勇健,YUAN Mao,PU Yong-jian(重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400044);雷勇,LEI Yong(重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400044;重庆师范大学经济管理学院,重庆,400040) |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金资助项目，重庆师范大学基金资助项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 基于现代经济学公平偏好理论,通过扩展双代理人与注入刻画代理人之间关于收益比较的横向公平性偏好因素,改进传统经济学纯粹自利性假设下的单代理人的HM模型,设计包括横向公平偏好因素在内的新委托-代理激励机制,并分析非对称信息下的代理成本.结果显示:为了降低"道德风险",委托人无需采取监督与控制的办法,只要雇佣横向公平性偏好程度尽可能高的代理人,就会尽可能减少代理成本,增加委托人的期望收益,这为解决传统经济学理论中由于信息非对称所带来的高监督成本难题,提供了一条有效的新思路.
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| 关 键 词： | 横向公平 委托代理 激励机制 代理成本 |
Incentive Mechanisms and Analysis of Agency Cost Based on Fairness Theory |
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| YUAN Mao,LEI Yong,PU Yong-jian. Incentive Mechanisms and Analysis of Agency Cost Based on Fairness Theory[J]. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2011, 25(2) |
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| Authors: | YUAN Mao LEI Yong PU Yong-jian |
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| Affiliation: | YUAN Mao1,LEI Yong1,2,PU Yong-jian1(1.College of Economics & Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China,2.College of Economics & Management,Chongqing Normal University,Chongqing 400040,China) |
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| Abstract: | There has been a growing concern in the field of economics about resolving the dilemma between lowering the agency cost caused by asymmetric information and increasing moral risk problems.Although the principal-agent theory can help remove the dilemma,it does not take into consideration high supervision and control costs.The goal of this paper is to seek solutions to effectively reducing the agency cost from the perspective of behavior economics.By emphasizing the intrinsic factors of agents,we introduced t... |
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| Keywords: | horizontal fairness preference principal-agent incentives mechanism agency cost |
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