基于多属性逆向拍卖的节能服务公司选择研究

合同能源管理是一种新型的节能机制,节能服务需求方与节能服务公司通过合作共享收益。合同能源管理实施的一个难点是节能服务公司(ESCO)的选择,然而,相关研究尚不充分。本文以政府为节能服务需求方,基于多属性逆向拍卖模型研究了ESCO选择问题。ESCO的投标集由三个属性决定,即节能量、项目完成期以及节能收益分享比例。本文通过非合作博弈研究政府和多ESCO间的逆向拍卖行为,将利润分享比例作为能源节省量与项目提前期的函数,我们推导出各ESCO的最优投标策略;在此基础上,每一个ESCO可以通过自身的技术与能力来决定投标策略;于是,在不忽视利润分享的前提下,政府可以依据能源节省量与项目提起期来挑选最优的ESCO。这种ESCO选择机制回避了节能收益分配的谈判,限制了ESCO间的恶意竞争,从而提高了整个合同能源管理过程的运作效率。仿真研究显示,ESCO数量的增加会降低各方的收益,于是,政府有必要限制参与逆向拍卖的ESCO数量。

Selecting Energy Service Company based on Multi-attribute Reverse Auction

Energy Performance Contracting (EPC) is a new mechanism for energy saving. In the Energy Performance Contracting, the energy service demander and energy service company (ESCO) cooperate to save energy and share the benefit. One difficulty in actualizing the EPC is to select the best ESCO. However, there are few literatures to analyze the efficient selection mechanism. A government is used as the energy service demander and the ESCO selection based on multi-attribute reverse auction model is studied in the paper. The ESCO's strategy depends on three attributes, including the energy saving quantities supplied, the project leading time, and the sharing proportion of the energy saving benefit. A non-cooperative game model is proposed to study the multi-attribute reverse auction between a government and n qualified ESCOs. Regarding the sharing proportion of the energy saving benefits as a function of the energy saving quantities supplied and the project leading time, the optimal strategy of the ESCO can be obtained. As a result, every ESCO can determine the bidding strategy according to its actual energy-saving technologies and capabilities, and the government can directly select the winning ESCO based on the optimal combination of energy saving quantities supplied and project leading time without negotiating on sharing proportion of the energy saving benefits. Subsequently, the ESCO selection mechanism is able to avoid the bargaining procedure in determining the benefit share, and constrain the vicious competition among the ESCOs. As a result, the actualizing efficiency of the EPC project is improved. The simulation experiment discovers that, along with the increase of the number of the ESCOs, the benefits of both the government and the ESCO will decrease. As a result, the government should set some criteria to limit the number of the ESCOs participating in the auction.