| 关系型信贷、信息不对称与信贷退出博弈 |
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| 引用本文： | 石智勇,索贵彬. 关系型信贷、信息不对称与信贷退出博弈[J]. 西安电子科技大学学报(社会科学版), 2006, 16(2): 45-49 |
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| 作者姓名： | 石智勇 索贵彬 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津大学,管理学院,天津,300072 |
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| 基金项目： | 山东省科技发展计划资助课题(031080153) |
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| 摘 要： | 在我国,关系型信贷的方式被普遍采用,关系型信贷模式有助于消除借贷双方信息不对称,提高效率。本文对关系型信贷进行了明确的界定,具体分析了关系型信贷对银企双方的利益以及潜在风险,对关系型信贷中信贷退出行为进行了博弈分析。在信贷退出中,只有商业银行的信贷退出决策成为可以置信的承诺,才有助于维系双方的合作。
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| 关 键 词： | 关系型信贷 信息 商业银行 博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-472X(2006)02-0045-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-09-10 |
Loan Exit Gaming with Relationship Lending and Information Dissymmetry |
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| SHI Zhi-yong,SUO Gui-bin. Loan Exit Gaming with Relationship Lending and Information Dissymmetry[J]. Journal of Xidian University (Social Sciences Edition), 2006, 16(2): 45-49 |
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| Authors: | SHI Zhi-yong SUO Gui-bin |
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| Abstract: | Relationship lending,which is helpful for the commercial banks and the enterprises to communicate information and enhance financing efficiency,is popular in our country.This paper defines the relationship lending and analyzes the value that both partners will obtain in relationship lending,as well as some risks they will be face with,and then analyzes the behaviors of loans exit with game theory.Only when the decision of loan exit is made authentic promise by the banks,can it be helpful for the cooperation of banks and enterprises. |
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| Keywords: | relationship lending information commercial bank gaming |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
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