基于Stackelberg博弈的变质物品分销网络设计模型

研究了一类短销售期的变质物品的分销网络设计问题.假定零售商的缺货成本依赖于分配给为其提供服务的分销中心的库存成本,供应商在销售期末给零售商提供第二次订货机会,供应商根据零售商的订货决策确定分销中心的最优选址和确定每个分销中心为哪些零售商提供服务,从而最小化总的运作成本(选址成本,运输成本,库存成本和变质成本),其中分销中心的运输成本和库存成本依赖于零售商确定的订货数量;而零售商则根据供应商的决策确定自身的最优订货决策,利用Stackelberg博弈分析的方法,建立了一类变质物品的分销网络设计模型,并使用拉格朗日松弛算法求解,最后通过数值算例分析了模型最优解对于参数的敏感性.

Distribution Network Design Model for Deteriorating Items Based on Stackelberg Game

The distribution network design model for a class of deteriorating items with short selling seasons is investigated in this paper.It is assumed that the shortage costs of the retailers are dependent on the holding costs of the distribution centers which are assigned to serve the retailers, re sp ecti vel y, and the supplier offers a second order opportunity to the retailers at the end of the selling season.The suppliers choose the optimal locations to set up distribution centers, as well as determining each retailer served by which distribution center, and to minimize the total operation costs(facility location cost, transportatio n co st, inventory co st and deterioratio n co st), where the transportation cost and inventory cost of the distribution centers are dependent on the order quantities of the retailers'.The retailers determine the optimal replenishment decision according to the supplier's deci sio n, respectively.The method of Stackelberg game analysis is introduced, and a class of distribution network design models for deteriorating items is established A Lagrangian relaxation algorithm is also presented to solve the proposed models.At last, a numerical example is given to illustrate the sensitivity of the optimal solution on the change of the parameter.