分税制、政府博弈与制度创新——一个佃农理论的分析框架

通过把在分税制下中央政府与地方政府的制度供求博弈关系转换为佃农理论中的土地所有者与土地承租者之间的租金分成契约关系,并在过去研究制度变迁范式的基础上,提出"地方政府主导型诱致性制度变迁"的谈判博弈理论模型,认为,中国的市场化改革是在中央与地方政府之间的租金分成博弈过程中向市场体制的渐进性过渡。尤其是,分税制激励利益独立且追求剩余租金最大化的地方政府化解外生性交易成本与内生性交易成本之间的冲突,从而自发地主导这场规模空前巨大的制度转轨。

System of Tax Distribution, Government Game and Institution Innovation——A Framework under the Theory of Tenant Peasant

This paper transfers the supply and demand game relationship between the central government and local government under the tax-sharing system into a rent-sharing contract between land owner and lessee. Based on the post studies on the institutional change paradigm, it provides a "local government leading induced institutional change" bargaining game theory model. This model proves that China’s marketization reform is a game process of the central and local government sharing the rent, which is a gradual transition into the market system. Especially, Tax-sharing System incentives the and rent-maximizing local government with independent interests to pursue resolve the conflict between the exogenous and endogenous transaction costs, who spontaneously leads this great institutional transition.