交易专项投资对伙伴机会主义行为影响的实证研究

以企业交易专项投资与伙伴强形式和弱形式机会主义行为的关系为研究对象,重点探讨其随伙伴交易专项投资水平和关系持续时间的变化趋势。以制造商营销渠道负责人和分销商采购人员为调研对象,通过问卷调查获得216组家电行业制造商-分销商配对样本数据,采用多元调节回归对假设进行验证。研究结果表明,随着伙伴交易专项投资水平的增加,企业交易专项投资会从引发伙伴两类机会主义行为转变为抑制伙伴机会主义行为,特别是企业交易专项投资对伙伴强形式机会主义行为的作用变化较为显著;随着交易关系的延续,企业交易专项投资始终增强伙伴的强形式机会主义行为,并不随关系持续而发生明显改变,但企业交易专项投资会从引发转变为抑制伙伴的弱形式机会主义行为。

Contract-farming supply chain coordination mechanism based on B-S model

Taking focus on the relationship between a firm′s transaction-specific investments(TSIs) and its partner′s strong-form and weak-form opportunisms,the moderating effects of the partner′s TSIs and relationship duration are investigated.By survey of marketing channel managers of manufactures and buyers of distributors,matched survey data(216 paired sample firms) from both sides of manufacturer-distributor in China′s household appliance industry is obtained.Moderated regression model is used to test the hypotheses proposed.The results suggest that as the partner′s TSIs increase,the relationships between of a firm′s TSIs and partner′s two forms of opportunisms may shift from positive to negative;especially the impact on strong-form opportunisms is more significant.And as the relationship endures,a firm′s TSIs may always increase partner′s strong-form opportunisms without significant change,but the relationship between of a firm′s TSIs and partner′s weak-form opportunisms may shift from positive to negative.