The Micro-Formation Mechanism of Trade Conflicts between Large Developing Countries: India's Anti-dumping Action against China |
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作者姓名: | Wang Xiaosong Xie Shenxiang |
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作者单位: | [1]School of Economics, Renmin University of China [2]School of International Trade and Economics, Shandong University of Finance and Economics |
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基金项目: | This article is an interim product of"Research into a Strategic System to Enable Chinese Enterprises to Cope with Trade Barriers against the Background of Prevailing International Trade Protectionism," a project funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China for Youth (71203228). The constructive advice of anonymous reviewers is aooreciated. |
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摘 要: | 以Grossman和Helpman的“保护待售”模型为理论基础,使用1999-2009年案件层面的数据,定量分析印度对华反倾销税裁定的影响因素,揭示中印经济冲突的微观形成机制,可以发现:印度反倾销申诉者的政治势力会显著提高最终裁定的税率水平,进151渗透率同税率之间的关系则取决于申诉者在政治上是否有组织;反倾销税率同印度对华贸易逆差之间呈显著的正相关关系。这意味着,印度当局裁定反倾销税率时,明显受国内利益集团政治势力的影响,同时也有打压中国、谋求在龙象之争中获取优势的动机。
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关 键 词: | “龙象之争”对华反倾销“保护待售”模型政治势力 |
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