超越"零和博弈":央地财政关系研究的范式转换

传统基于"零和博弈"视角的央地财政关系研究,将央地财政关系视为一种摇摆于集权与分权之间的轮回,并不能发现、解释央地财政关系中的发展与变化。因此,应当超越"零和博弈"的视角,运用一种"非零和博弈"的解释范式来考察央地之间权力分配或博弈。运用"非零和博弈"的研究范式,可以克服旧有模式中所展现的央地关系的集权与分权的"循环论",并能够寻找、解释央地关系中所具有的"发展性"。

Beyond Zero-game: Paradigm Transformation of the Central-local Fiscal Relationship Research

The traditional views on the fiscal relations between central and local governments are usually based on zero-game paradigm,which regard central-local fiscal relation as an endless pendulum between centralization and decentralization.Zero-game paradigm can not find and explain changes of the central-local fiscal relations.We should review central-local fiscal relations in a non-zero paradigm,in which the central and the local are not incompatible,but helpful with each other.Non-zero paradigm can overcome the shortcomings of the traditional method and can provide a more useful perspective to explain the central-local fiscal relations.