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企业碳配额视角下减排技术投入研究
引用本文:侯强,孙晶.企业碳配额视角下减排技术投入研究[J].沈阳工业大学学报(社会科学版),2017,10(5):434-441.
作者姓名:侯强  孙晶
作者单位:沈阳工业大学 管理学院, 沈阳 110870
基金项目:辽宁省社会科学基金项目(L15BJY035);沈阳市科技局软科学研究项目(F16-233-5-08);辽宁省财政科研基金管理办公室项目(16C003)
摘    要:以政府碳配额和碳减排技术投资补贴政策为背景,针对供应链企业的碳减排技术投入行为与企业的合作关系问题,运用博弈和最优化方法构建无协调机制、合作博弈、集中决策和社会福利最大化状态下的决策模型,并采用逆向归纳法对模型进行求解。对各种状态下的减排努力水平、企业利润和社会福利进行分析和对比,并探讨减排投入成本等参数对其的影响,最后通过数值仿真证明模型的有效性,以期为供应链企业选择最优合作策略选择和政府补贴政策的设计提供理论支撑。

关 键 词:供应链  碳减排  技术投入  碳配额  政府补贴  博弈  

Research on investment of emission reduction technology from perspective of carbon quota of enterprises
HOU Qiang,SUN Jing.Research on investment of emission reduction technology from perspective of carbon quota of enterprises[J].Journal of Shenyang University of Technology(Social Science Edition),2017,10(5):434-441.
Authors:HOU Qiang  SUN Jing
Institution:School of Management, Shenyang University of Technology, Shenyang 110870, China
Abstract:In the context of the government carbon quota and carbon emission reduction technology investment subsidy policy, the relationship issues are considering between carbon emission reduction technology investment behavior and enterprise cooperation in supply chain enterprises. By using the game and the optimization methods, the decision models are constructed under the states of no coordination mechanism, collaborative game theory, centralized decision making and social welfare maximization. The models are solved by backward induction. Analysis and contrast are made concerning the levels of emission reduction efforts, the corporate profits and social welfare in all states. And the influence of the parameters such as emission reduction investment and cost is discussed. Finally the effectiveness of the model is proved by numerical simulation, so as to provide theoretical support for the selection of optimal cooperation strategy and the design of government subsidy policy for supply chain enterprises.
Keywords:supply chain  carbon emission reduction  technology investment  carbon quota  government subsidy  game  
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