| 我国地方政府经济竞争激励分析 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 熊毅.我国地方政府经济竞争激励分析[J].太原理工大学学报(社会科学版),2007,25(3):1-4. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 熊毅 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 中南财经政法大学,经济系,湖北,武汉430060 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 理论分析表明官员外在激励条件不具备,扭曲了官员经济竞争目的和行为,导致官员外在激励有效性缺乏。体现在:一是激励报酬缺乏导致了官员经济竞争的政治目的;二是业绩考核欠准为官员经济竞争实现政治目的提供了条件。我国地方官员经济竞争效率低下的现实也证明了这点。官员外在激励有效性缺乏也突出了官员内在激励的重要性。
|
| 关 键 词： | 官员竞争 效率 内在激励 |
| 文章编号： | 1009-5837(2007)03-0001-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007年4月25日 |
Intrinsic Analysis of the Incentive of Local Economic Competition in Our Country |
| |
| XIONG Yi.Intrinsic Analysis of the Incentive of Local Economic Competition in Our Country[J].Journal of Taiyuan University of Technology(Social Sciences Edition),2007,25(3):1-4. |
| |
| Authors: | XIONG Yi |
| |
| Abstract: | Since lacking of external incentive,the behavior of officers in economic competitions is twisted,and the economic activities of local authority are lacking in efficiency.The reason lies in:firstly,lacking of the payoff.incentive caused the political purpose of officers in economic competition;secondly,performance examination for officers is not accurate enough and this offers the condition the political purpose is realized.The external incentive of the officers is invalid is demonstruted by the low economic efficiency.Therefore official's intrinsic incentive is extremely important. |
| |
| Keywords: | officer competition efficiency intrinsic incentive |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
