| 经理声誉考虑、任务关联性和长期报酬激励的效果研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 孔峰,刘鸿雁. 经理声誉考虑、任务关联性和长期报酬激励的效果研究[J]. 南开管理评论, 2009, 12(1) |
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| 作者姓名： | 孔峰 刘鸿雁 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 北京科技大学经济管理学院
2. 华北电力大学经济管理系 |
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| 摘 要： | 为研究如何激励经理努力提高企业未来业绩,假设经理承担着两项任务:声誉激励其提高企业当前业绩,报酬激励其提高未来业绩;在多任务委托代理模型框架下,本文研究了声誉和长期报酬对经理提高未来业绩的激励效果.本文把企业业绩分为当期业绩和长期(即未来)业绩,并假设委托人目标是长期企业业绩最大化,而不是当期业绩最大化.同时本文对经理努力成本函数的假设有重大改进:给出了经理长期和短期努力的具体的成本函数形式,考虑了两种任务即努力间的关联性情况,假设长期努力和当期努力有不同的成本系数.目前相关模型的成本函数最多只能满足以上三个条件中的前两个.因此,运用本文多任务委托代理模型分析得出的结论更明确、直观,并且更符合实际.本文发现,经理不同努力的成本、两项任务之间的关联性对经理的努力行为选择有重要的影响,要激励经理提高企业长期业绩,应该减少经理长期努力的成本或者弱化当期激励.
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| 关 键 词： | 经理报酬 激励 声誉 多任务委托代理模型 长期激励 |
Incentive Effects of Long-term Compensation When Managers are Concerned about Reputation and Undertake Multiple Tasks |
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| Kong Feng,Liu Hongyan. Incentive Effects of Long-term Compensation When Managers are Concerned about Reputation and Undertake Multiple Tasks[J]. Nankai Business Review, 2009, 12(1) |
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| Authors: | Kong Feng Liu Hongyan |
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| Affiliation: | Kong Feng~1 Liu Hongyan~2 1.School of Economics , Management,University of Science , Technology Beijing,2.Department of Economics , Management,North China Electric Power University |
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| Abstract: | It can be detrimental to shareholders if corporate managers are only concerned with current or short-term firm performance and overlook long-term performance.It is important that managers be motivated to enhance not only current firm performance but also long-run performance.However,few papers on executive remuneration distinguish between current and long-run firm performance when they model managerial compensation incentives.In order to study the different incentive effects of compensation and managerial r... |
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| Keywords: | Executive Compensation Incentive Reputation Multi-Task Principle-agent Model Long-term Incentives |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
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