Warum die Weltgesellschaft nicht existiert. Kritische Reflexionen zu einigen empirischen und epistemologischen Problemen der Theorie der Weltgesellschaft

Use of the term “World Society” in its present connotations is becoming an accepted part of the vocabulary of globalization in academic thinking. Despite its relatively rapid rise as an analytical tool, the popularity of the term does not appear to be matched by any widespread consensus concerning its precise meaning. This paper therefore sets out to take a recapitulating look at the concept of “World Society” from both a theoretical and systematical standpoint. The aim is to offer a detailed account of the concept of World Society. Current sociological research on World Society focuses on three sets of central assumptions, which are of special relevance for its genesis: 1. Communication technologies; 2. Global diffusion of cultural/ normative patterns; 3. Functional Differentiation. This serves as the backdrop for an analysis of the epistemological limitations and modal epistemological problems of World Society Theory. Epistemic modality deals with the reality or truth-status of propositions. Due to reflections on philosophy of modality, this paper attempts to show that socio-cultural rules as such are merely “virtual”. Structures are not fixed or given. They exist only as they are instantiated in action. On this basis the paper argues that world society does not exist, because World society theory mostly overlooks implementation. It attends almost entirely to law on the books, not law in action. Synonymous with the Western metaphysical tradition world society theory presents a modern version of a Platonic theory of ideas. In a critical discussion of concepts of World Society Theory, the limits of this approach as well as noteworthy challenges for historical-sociological research on contemporary processes of globalization are identified.