首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

利益集团视角下国有银行不良资产
引用本文:李世尧. 利益集团视角下国有银行不良资产[J]. 重庆工商大学学报(社会科学版), 2010, 27(6): 40-46. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1672-0598.2010.06.008
作者姓名:李世尧
作者单位:浙江财经学院经济与国际贸易学院
基金项目:浙江省哲学社会科学规划课题重大项目,浙江财经学院2008级研究生校级科研项目
摘    要:在特定历史背景和体制约束下,本文从利益集团的视角来探求经济危机加快国有银行不良资产处置的一般机理.研究表明:利益集团对"公地"性质的国有银行信贷资金的寻租与不合作是改革拖延的原因,而经济危机和银行体制转换压力促使国有银行不良资产处置的突破;利益集团之间议价能力的悬殊影响拖延的长短,只有制衡和协调利益集团才能加快国有银行针对不良资产的体制改革.

关 键 词:利益集团  国有银行不良资产  突破  博弈

Delay and Breakthrough on Treatment of the Non-performing Assets Of State-owned Banks in a Perspective of Interest Groups
LI Shi-yao. Delay and Breakthrough on Treatment of the Non-performing Assets Of State-owned Banks in a Perspective of Interest Groups[J]. Journal of Chongqing Technology and Business University Social Science Edition, 2010, 27(6): 40-46. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1672-0598.2010.06.008
Authors:LI Shi-yao
Abstract:Under the specific historical background and institutional constraints. this article discusses the mechanism that the financial crisis can speed up the treatment on non-performing assets (NPA) of state-owned banks (SOB) in a perspective of interest groups. The study shown that the interest groups chase rent-seeking and defect on the credit funds of SOB that can explain the delay, the reform breakthrough is actuated by the economic crisis and the banking system transformation pressure; the disparity of bargaining ability between the interest groups affect length of delay, only to balance and cooperate between the interest groups, can we accelerate the reform on SOB of NPA.
Keywords:interest groups   NPA Of SOB   breakthrough   game
本文献已被 万方数据 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《重庆工商大学学报(社会科学版)》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《重庆工商大学学报(社会科学版)》下载全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号