| 终极控制人、负责融资与企业非效率投资 |
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| 引用本文： | 张栋.终极控制人、负责融资与企业非效率投资[J].中国管理科学,2009,17(6):177-185. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张栋 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 西安交通大学管理学院, 陕西 西安 710049;
2. 中国人民银行乌鲁木齐中心支行, 新疆 乌鲁木齐 830002 |
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| 摘 要： | 通过对LSV模型的扩展,构建终极控制人对企业投资影响两期静态理论模型,研究终极控制人对企业投资的影响.分析表明,终极控制人在谋取控制权私有收益情况下,"隧道挖掘"成本越小,企业投资者保护程度越差时,终极控制人越易进行过度投资;终极控制人为国有性质的企业比终极控制人为非国有性质的企业更易过度投资;负债融资具有一定的相机治理效应,可提高终极控制人的投资决策点,抑制终极控制人过度投资.
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| 关 键 词： | LLSV模型 终极控制人 负债融资 过度投资 |
| 收稿时间： | 2008-12-15; |
| 修稿时间： | 2009-10-15 |
Ultimate Controlling Shareholders, debt Financing and the Firms’ Inefficient Investment |
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| ZHANG Dong.Ultimate Controlling Shareholders, debt Financing and the Firms’ Inefficient Investment[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2009,17(6):177-185. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Dong |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Management, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710049, China;
2. Urumqi branch of the People's Bank of China, Urumqi 830002, China |
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| Abstract: | This paper has established a model that ultimate controlling shareholders influence the corporate investment behavior by expanding LLSV model.Our results indicate when the ultimate controlling shareholders figure for private benefit of control, the tunneling cost is small, the investor protection is bad, and the ultimate controlling shareholders will process over-investment.But debt financing can heighten the cutoff point of ultimate controlling shareholders'investment and suppress ultimate controlling shareholders' over-investment. |
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| Keywords: | LLSV model ultimate controlling shareholders debt financing over-investment |
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