需求不确定下两阶段应用服务供应链市场风险分担机制研究

针对应用服务提供商(ASP)与独立软件开发商(ISV)组成的两阶段应用服务供应链面临需求不确定与服务竞争引发的市场风险问题,建立了随机需求下的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究了ASP承担风险与ISV承担风险两种市场风险分担机制。研究结果表明,当由ISV承担风险时,ASP将向ISV定购其所分配服务需求的上限;ASP承担风险时,ISV将向ASP提供一个软件许可销售计划,并通过提高软件开发质量及维护升级服务水平来提高ASP订购软件许可的积极性;ASP作为盟主的风险分担机制较ISV作为盟主的风险分担机制对应用服务供应链的协调效果好。

Research on Market Risk Sharing Mechanism of Two-Stage Application Service Supply Chain under Demand Uncertainty

A Stackelberg game model is developed for studying the market risk,caused by demand uncertainty and service competition in the two stage application service supply chain,which is composed of the Application Service Provider(ASP)and Independent Soft ware Vendor(ISV).The two different kinds of risk sharing mechanisms,ASP taking the risk or ISV taking the risk,are studied.The research result shows that,ASP will order the maximal amount of the allocated service demand when the ISV takes the risk.and a soft ware license sales plan is provided by ISV when the ASP takes the risk.At that time,ISV will incent ASP to order more soft ware license quantity by improving the soft ware quality and service level of upgrading the soft ware.Through the numerical analysis,the risk sharing mechanism of the ASP taking the risk is better than the mechanism of the ISV taking the risk from the perspective of the performance of application service supply chain.