差异化风险及买方市场环境下的审计师行为选择研究——基于上市公司操纵“会税差”的视角

为降低盈余操纵行为被市场或监管机构发现的概率,公司可能会选择承担盈余操纵所产生的税负成本。相应地,在客户主导的审计市场上,审计师可能会因自身承担较低风险而配合客户的纳税型盈余操纵。以2012—2016年A股上市公司为样本,检验了异常审计收费及审计意见是否在纳税和非纳税这两种类型的盈余操纵中存在差异。研究发现,客户为操纵盈余纳税和不纳税都降低了公司的盈余持续性,且纳税型盈余操纵可能造成公司未来更大的经营风险,更有可能损害投资者利益,但审计师会通过提高审计收费和发表非无保留审计意见应对客户的非纳税型操纵盈余行为,而不太重视更为隐蔽的纳税型操纵盈余,以规避客户的流失,这种现象在透明度低的公司中更可能出现。研究揭示了竞争压力下审计师权衡风险后对客户纳税型盈余操纵的"纵容"行为,有助于监管部门提升对公司中较隐蔽的纳税型盈余操纵及相应审计师行为的关注和规范。

Research on the Behavior of Auditors under Differentiated Risk and Buyer's Market Based on Perspective of Earnings Manipulation between Accounting Profit and Taxable Profit in Listed Companies

The companies may pay the tax for their earnings manipulation to avoid being suspected by capital market or regulators. Accordingly, in buyer''s market where customers orient the trade, we would like to know whether auditors would cooperate with their clients due to auditors'' relatively low risk when companies involve in tax-paying earnings manipulation. With the sample of A-share listed companies during the years from 2012 to 2016, we examine whether there is any difference in the abnormal auditing fees and auditing opinions between tax-paying and non-tax-paying earnings manipulation. The research finds that the earnings persistence has been reduced no matter whether companies pay the tax for their earnings manipulation or not. The tax-paying earnings manipulation is likely to result in more business risks in the companies and more likely to damage the interests of investors. However, auditors may react on the non-tax-paying behaviors by increasing the audit fees and issuing the non-standard audit opinions, but they pay less attention to the tax-paying earnings manipulation which is harder to detect, for the purpose of keeping clients. This phenomenon is more common in the companies with low transparency. This paper reveals the auditors'' act of connivance under the pressure of competition after auditors weigh the risks of indulging their clients'' tax-paying earnings manipulation, in the hope that the findings can help regulatory departments increase their concern and regulation on the hidden tax-paying earnings manipulation and related auditors'' selective behaviors.