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税收竞争理论文献综述
引用本文:张薇薇.税收竞争理论文献综述[J].浙江社会科学,2008,52(2):23-29.
作者姓名:张薇薇
作者单位:北京大学光华管理学院,北京,100871
摘    要:本文从税收竞争理论的起源到发展对税收竞争文献进行了综述。基础的税收竞争模型讨论了资本税竞争的效率损失问题,发现资本税的竞争会导致过低的税率和公共品供给水平。此后,在基础税收竞争模型中加入非对称竞争、劳动的移动、多种税收工具、不完全信息、不完全竞争和承诺问题等因素,发现税收竞争也有提高效率的作用。与最初的税收竞争文献相反,近来的研究发现垂直税收竞争和双边税收协定也会导致过高的税率和公共品供给水平。

关 键 词:税收竞争  效率  公共品供给  双边税收协定  竞争理论  文献综述  Competition  Theories  研究  作用  效率损失  因素  承诺问题  不完全竞争  不完全信息  移动  劳动  非对称  供给水平  公共品  税率  发现  资本税

Survey on Theories of Tax Competition
Zhang Weiwei.Survey on Theories of Tax Competition[J].Zhejiang Social Sciences,2008,52(2):23-29.
Authors:Zhang Weiwei
Abstract:This survey is on the origin and development of theories of tax competition.The basic tax competition model discusses the loss of efficiency in the capital tax competition and finds that lead the tax rates and public good at very low levels.Some authors add the unsymmetrical competition,labor mobility,multiple tax instruments,incomplete information,imperfect competition and commitment problems into the basic model.They find that tax competition also has the efficiency-enhancing role.Opposite to the early demonstration,more recent contributions find that the vertical tax competition and double taxation conventions will lead to too high tax rates and too high levels of public good supply.
Keywords:Tax competition  Efficiency public goods supply
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