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Peer group ties and executive compensation networks
Authors:Matthew Pittinsky  Thomas A DiPrete
Institution:1. School of Social and Family Dynamics, Arizona State University, United States;2. Department of Sociology, Columbia University, United States;1. Department of Sociology, Montana State University, P.O. Box 172380, Bozeman, MT 59717-2380, USA;2. Department of Pharmacy Practice and Pharmaceutical Sciences, University of Minnesota, 232 Life Science, Duluth, MN 55812-3003, USA;1. Department of Sociology, Northwestern University, 1812 Chicago Avenue, Evanston, IL 60208, United States;2. Department of Sociology, Northwestern University, United States;3. Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel;4. Department of Anthropology, Northwestern University, United States;5. Department of Preventative Medicine, Northwestern University, United States;6. Department of Quantitative Health Sciences, University of Massachusetts Medical School, United States
Abstract:Publicly traded firms in the US typically determine C.E.O. compensation by benchmarking the pay of their C.E.O.s against the pay of C.E.O.s in “peer” firms. Consequently, executive compensation is influenced not only by firm-level characteristics, but also by the selection and actions of the firm’s immediate peers as well as by the structure of the executive compensation network overall. Analyzing compensation peer group choices made by the same 1183 firms for F.Y. 2007, 2008 and 2009, we find that while the typical compensation peer is similar in size and industry to the firm that chose it, deviations from this norm are common, especially among larger firms, and tend to be towards larger firms with better paid CEOs. Further analysis shows that firms who pay CEOs well relative to the pay that would be predicted from their revenues, return on assets, and industry tend to have greater aspiration bias in their group of named peers.
Keywords:Inequality  Networks  Executive compensation  Labor markets  Elites
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