博弈解析:审计独立性威胁与制度环境约束

该文认为,现行审计委托代理关系中审计师选聘权安排是独立性威胁存在的客观基础。博弈分析表明,仅从审计制度本身考虑,独立性威胁将导致审计师坚持审计独立性的内在动力不足。进一步的分析表明,制度环境——特别是有效的市场竞争与价格机制、法制制度环境有助于约束独立性威胁:市场机制(特别是竞争与价格机制)通过对选择高质量审计服务偏好给予奖励或成本上的好处,可提高审计师的独立性;法律机制则通过增加虚假披露或鉴证信息方的成本,改变博弈双方的收益成本对比,促使高质量审计服务需求的增加,约束独立性威胁。

Independence Threat of Auditing and Restrictions of Institutional Environment: An Analysis of Game Theory

This paper maintains that in the current auditing relations, the right of selecting auditors acted by corporations is the objective basis of independence threat. An analysis of the game theory shows that independence threat can lead to the lack of inner impetus of the auditors to persist independence. Further analysis shows that institutional environment (especially market mechanism and legal institution environment) can restrain auditor's independence threat and improve the auditor's independence: accountability of market mechanism and legal mechanism can change benefit and cost of the parties involved in the game, thus stimulating the demand for high quality auditing. In this way, institutional environment can restrain auditor independence threat.