Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent |
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Authors: | Luis Corch��n Matteo Triossi |
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Affiliation: | 1. Departmento de Econom??a, Universidad Carlos III, Calle Madrid 126, 28903, Getafe, Madrid, Spain 2. Centro de Econom??a Aplicada, Departamento de Ingenier??a Industrial, Universidad de Chile, Avenida Republica 701, Santiago, Chile
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Abstract: | In this paper, we present a model of implementation where infeasible allocations are converted into feasible ones through a process of renegotiation that is represented by a reversion function. We describe the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium in a class of reversion functions that punish agents for infeasibilities. This is used to study the implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence and several axiomatic solutions to problems of bargaining and taxation. |
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