CONGESTION MODELS AND WEIGHTED BAYESIAN POTENTIAL GAMES |
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Authors: | Facchini Giovanni van Megen Freek Borm Peter Tijs Stef |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Econometrics and CentER, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands |
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Abstract: | Games associated with congestion situations à la Rosenthal (1973) have pure Nash equilibria. This result implicitly relies on the existence of a potential function. In this paper we provide a characterization of potential games in terms of coordination games and dummy games. Second, we extend Rosenthal's congestion model to an incomplete information setting, and show that the related Bayesian games are potential games and therefore have pure Bayesian equilibria. |
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Keywords: | Congestion situations decision under uncertainty game theory potentials |
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