Ex-post blindness as excuse? The effect of information disclosure on giving |
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| Institution: | 1. Indus Synchrotron Utilization Division, Raja Ramanna Centre for Advanced Technology, Indore 452013, India;2. Homi Bhabha National Institute, Raja Ramanna Centre for Advanced Technology, Indore 452013, India;3. Laser Biomedical Applications & Instrumentation Division, Raja Ramanna Centre for Advanced Technology, Indore 452013, India;4. Atomic and Molecular Physics Division, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Mumbai 400085, India;1. Department of Finance and Insurance, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong;2. Private Enterprise Research Center, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77845, USA;1. School of Business, Aalto University, P.O. Box 21220, 00076 Aalto, Finland;2. Department of Social Research, University of Helsinki, P.O. Box 9, 00014 University of Helsinki, Finland;3. Helsinki Institute for Information Technology HIIT, Aalto University, P.O. Box 19215, 00076 Aalto, Finland;4. Middle East Technical University, Department of Industrial Engineering, 06800 Ankara, Turkey;1. Colorado College, 314 E Cache La Poudre St, Colorado Springs, CO 80903, USA;2. Kansas State University, 327 Waters Hall, Manhattan, KS 66506, USA;3. Cornell University, 305 Savage Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA |
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| Abstract: | People passing by beggars without leaving a penny are not necessarily pure money-maximizers. In the world of sincere and dishonest recipients, some donors might anticipate the disutility they will suffer at the moment they realize their help is misdirected and reduce their willingness to donate to avoid these psychological costs. I employ a dictator game with ex-ante uncertainty about recipient’s endowment and requests from recipients to study how donors react to ex-post revelation of recipient’s type. I observe no difference in donations with and without ex-post information about recipient’s endowment. However, if donors could choose if they want to receive such information themselves, nearly a third of dictators choose to remain ignorant. Those dictators who choose to ex-post reveal the endowment of the recipient give significantly more. |
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| Keywords: | Prosocial behavior Self-image Ignorance Ex-post disclosure |
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