Second and third party punishment under costly monitoring |
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| Institution: | 1. Alfred-Weber-Institute of Economics, University of Heidelberg, Bergheimer Strasse 20, D-69115 Heidelberg, Germany;2. Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, Department of Socioeconomics, University of Hamburg, Welckerstrasse 8, D-20354 Hamburg, Germany;1. Department of Social Psychology, Tilburg Institute for Behavioral Economics Research (TIBER), Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000LE Tilburg, The Netherlands;2. Business Faculty, Universidad de los Andes, Calle 21 No. 1-20, Bogotá, Colombia;3. Radboud University, Institute for Computing and Information Sciences (iCIS), Data Science Department, Nijmegen, The Netherlands;1. Department of Applied Economics and Statistics, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716, United States;2. Dyson School for Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14850, United States;1. School of Psychology and Cognitive Science, East China Normal University, 200062 Shanghai, China;2. Department of Psychology and Beijing Key Laboratory of Behavior and Mental Health, Peking University, 100871 Beijing, China |
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| Abstract: | In a laboratory experiment we study how costly punishment behavior of second and third parties in a social dilemma situation is affected by monitoring costs. Subjects have to pay a fee over and above punishment costs if they wish to condition punishments on previous play, which is equivalent to a binary choice between the acquisition of perfect information on the target subject’s behavior and no information at all. When monitoring is costly both second and third party punishment is weaker and less discriminate and hence generates weaker incentives for cooperation than when monitoring is free. There are subtle differences between second and third parties: The presence of monitoring costs leads subjects to withhold sanctioning more often as second parties than as third parties, and to punish indiscriminately more often as third parties than as second parties. The results contribute to the understanding of peer-enforcement of cooperation in social dilemmas and whether there is a common motivational structure underpinning second and third party punishment. |
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| Keywords: | Punishment Social dilemma Monitoring Second party Third party Strategy method |
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