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非寿险专业代理展业博弈分析
引用本文:刘惠萍,张世英.非寿险专业代理展业博弈分析[J].天津大学学报(社会科学版),2004,6(3):232-236.
作者姓名:刘惠萍  张世英
作者单位:天津大学管理学院,天津,300072
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(10711001).
摘    要:代理人制度是国际保险业展业的主要方式,但目前我国非寿险业较少采用代理人展业方式,而以直接展业方式为主,这在一定程度上限制了非寿险业的发展。专业代理人展业方式优于个人代理人和直接展业方式,应成为我国非寿险公司的主要展业方式。通过分析得出一个分界规模,用以确定采用专业代理人展业方式作为最优选择的条件。为了避免专业代理人展业中的道德风险,设计了非寿险公司与专业代理人之间的最优委托代理合同。

关 键 词:专业代理人展业  逆向选择  道德风险  分界规模  最优委托代理合同
文章编号:1008-4339(2004)03-0232-05
修稿时间:2004年3月4日

Game Analysis on Marketing Form of Professional Agent for Non-Life Insurance
LIU Hui-ping,ZHANG Shi-ying.Game Analysis on Marketing Form of Professional Agent for Non-Life Insurance[J].Journal of Tianjin University(Social Sciences),2004,6(3):232-236.
Authors:LIU Hui-ping  ZHANG Shi-ying
Abstract:The system of agent is a principal form of international insurance marketing. But in Chinese non-life insurance companies the major marketing form is not agent marketing but direct one, which restricts the development of Chinese non-life insurance. It is held that professional agent form is the most profitable among personal agent, professional agent and direct form, thus it should be a main marketing form in Chinese non-life insurance. A scale limit is found to determine under which condition professional agent form is a best selection. In the end, an optimal principal agent contract between non-life insurance companies and professional agent is designed to avoid professional agent's moral hazard in marketing.
Keywords:professional agent marketing  adverse selection  moral hazard  scale limit  optimal principal agent contract
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