A Signaling Model of Repeated Elections |
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Authors: | Kenneth W Shotts |
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Institution: | (1) Stanford Graduate School of Business, 518 Memorial Way, Stanford, CA 94305-5015, USA |
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Abstract: | I develop a two period model of elections in which voters’ first period actions affect candidates’ estimates of voter preferences and thus affect second period electoral and policy outcomes. I find an equilibrium in which centrist voters abstain in the first election, despite facing zero costs of voting and having a strict preference between the alternatives before them. The reason centrists abstain is to signal their preferences to future candidates and thereby promote future policy moderation.For helpful discussions and comments I thank David Austen-Smith, Tim Feddersen, Roger Myerson, Tom Palfrey, Ronny Razin, two anonymous reviewers, and seminar participants at Kellogg, NYU, and the 2000 World Congress of the Game Theory Society. |
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