交错董事会制度在我国的合法性与功能分析

交错董事会制度作为“驱鲨剂冶的一种，起源于美国，现已成为西方国家公司治理中不可或缺的组成要素，并在其法律中有相应的条款进行规制。当下我国法律并未对交错董事会制度做出明确规制，实践中我国已有部分上市公司在章程中置入限制改选董事比例的条款，即被我国学者所称的交错董事会制度。但域外与本土交错董事会制度之间具有实质差异，本土交错董事会制度实质上限制了股东选举董事的权利，应属无效条款，而域外交错董事会制度符合我国法律的规定。另外，交错董事会制度能否发挥抵御敌意收购的功能并不仅取决于其自身，尚需考虑股东是否有任意罢免董事的权利。

Validity Analysis of Staggered Boards in China

The staggered boards is one of the shark repellents, which originated from the United States. Nowadays, the staggered boards has become an indispensable element of corporate governance in western countries, and there are corresponding provisions in their laws. In order to deal with the potential hostile take-over, some listed companies have inserted the term that limited the proportion of re-election directors in the articles of associations. However, in China, the lack of regulation makes the legality of staggered boards become continuously controversial. Therefore, it is particularly important and urgent to analyze the validity of staggered boards from the view of legal positivism.