When Opportunity Structure Knocks: Social Movements in the Soviet Union and Russian Federation

The notion of an opportunity structure has become both popular and confusing for social movement research. This paper attempts to clarify how opportunity structures are understood through a discussion of separatism in two cases: the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. Instead of being treated as a collective whole, opportunity structures are broken into three factors: A) constitutional rules and rights; B) elite control; and C) the state's capacity and propensity for repression. Factor A represents formal restrictions on potentially insurgent groups while factors B and C are informal restrictions. In the Soviet and Russian settings, four distinct opportunity structures are identified. The first, established under Stalin, was narrow, constraining potentially insurgent groups. But the second, which emerged under Gorbachev, was relatively wide and contributed to the willingness of various republics to declare independence. The third, established at the founding of the Russian Federation, was medium in width, but did not permit the types of activity found in the second. And lastly, the fourth can be dated to Putin's reforms of the early twenty-first century, and is narrow in character. Although future research is necessary for confirmation, this disaggregated model is intended to be generally applicable in other contexts.