首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

关于农民退出权的博弈分析
引用本文:周记,陈杰. 关于农民退出权的博弈分析[J]. 长江大学学报(社会科学版), 2004, 27(2): 95-98
作者姓名:周记  陈杰
作者单位:荆州市荆州区财政局直属财政所,湖北,荆州,434000;中南财经政法大学,工商管理学院,湖北,武汉,430064
摘    要:一个一次性静态博弈模型显示 :单纯种田获得农业收入或在保留口粮田的基础上外出打工 ,劳动力将面对四种可能的报酬结构 ;博弈分析的核心是农民退出权问题。存在自由退出权就存在退出成本。种田者和打工者退出成本的差别主要表现在机会成本上 ,应制定相关配套措施 ,妥善解决农民退出权问题。

关 键 词:退出权  博弈  退出成本
文章编号:1003-8019(2004)02-0095-04
修稿时间:2004-01-05

The Game Theoretical Analysis on Farmer''''s Rights to Withdraw From Lands
ZHOU Ji,CHEN Jie. The Game Theoretical Analysis on Farmer''''s Rights to Withdraw From Lands[J]. Journal of Yangtze University(Social Sciences), 2004, 27(2): 95-98
Authors:ZHOU Ji  CHEN Jie
Affiliation:ZHOU Ji 1 CHEN Jie 2
Abstract:A one-shot game model shows that under the circum st ances that pure farming can get agricultural income or going out to work as a te mporary laborer remaining a grain ration field, laborers will face four probable revenue structures, the core of game analysis is the problem about the right to withdraw of farmers. The right of free withdrawing means the cost of withdraw. The withdrawing cost difference between pure farmers and temporary laborers exis ts in the opportunity cost. The related matching measures shall be established t o appropriately solve the problems about the right to withdraw of farmers.
Keywords:rights to withdraw from lands  game  cost to withdr aw
本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号