双寡头电商平台的收费制度选择博弈

在竞争环境下,考虑两个开放型电商平台寡头主导的电商服务链,两平台对网商的收费制度为注册收费制、交易收费制、两部收费制等三种收费制度构成的策略集,本文构建了两平台的六种收费制度组合模型。通过博弈论逆序求解法和划线法分析发现:当平台的注册服务成本不低于交易服务成本时,两平台对网商的收费制度选择博弈不一定存在均衡,存在则必为其中一方采取交易收费制而另一方采取两部收费制这种分离均衡;反之,两平台对网商的收费制度选择博弈必定存在均衡,且为双方均选择注册收费制这种混同均衡。

The choice of the charging modes game of duopoly e-commerce platforms

E-commerce has greatly reduced the business burden of commercial transaction.Compared with the buyer,the price elasticity of the demand for platform fees by online seller is smaller.Therefore,the e-commerce platform generally adopts a discriminatory pricing strategy that only charge the online seller.However,in the case of fierce competition in multiple e-commerce platforms and the single homing of the online seller,the pricing of the e-commerce platform to the online seller will affect the enthusiasm of them to enter the platform and carry out transaction,thereby affecting the price of the commodity and the demand of the buyer.Ultimately,it affects the market share and revenue of the platform.Therefore,in a competitive environment,it is necessary to consider the third-party e-commerce platform charges the online seller.The article assumes that there are two e-commerce platforms,their tactical set of charging modes for the online seller is{registration charging mode,transaction charging mode,two-part tariff charging mode}.We construct six competitive modes between the two platforms,which are both platforms choose the registration fee charging mode,both platforms choose the transaction fee charging mode,both platforms choose the two-part tariff charging mode,one chooses the registration charging mode and the other chooses the transaction charging mode,one chooses the registration charging mode and the other chooses the two-part tariff charging mode,one chooses the transaction charging mode and the other chooses the two-part tariff charging mode.Firstly,in the assumptions section,based on the Hotelling model,the paper assumes that the registration service cost and transaction service cost of the platform are considered as exogenous variables,both the online seller and the buyer are single homing,the commodity demand is linearly negatively correlated with the commodity price of the platform itself,but linearly positively correlated with the commodity price and charges of the competitive platform.Through the indifference point of the utility of bilateral users,the number of the online seller and the market share of the two platforms can be obtained,which paves the way for the model solution of the second part.In order to reflect the interactive game process between e-commerce platform,logistics provider and online seller,the article supposes the platform decides firstly,then the logistics provider,and finally the online seller.Then,in the second part,this paper constructs six charging modes combination model,then by the reverse induction method of the game theory,we calculate the price equilibrium and profit equilibrium of the platforms,the online sellers and the logistics companies.The results show that when the two platforms select the same and different charging modes,the service cost of the platforms will have different impact on the profit of both platforms.Subsequently,the third part is the analysis of the game equilibrium between the two platforms on the charging modes combinations.Based on the profit obtained of the two platforms in the six models in the second part,the line method of the game theory is used to analyse the game equilibrium of the two platforms.The results show that the difference between the registration service cost and the transaction service cost of the platform will cause problems that there are no game equilibrium of the two platforms in some cases.Finally,In the fourth part,we summarize the findings.In a competitive environment,when both platforms choose the same charging mode,the profit of the two platforms are irrelevant to the service cost,and the profit of both parties is symmetrical.On the contrary,the profit of the two platforms are related to the service cost,and there is a significant difference between the two parties’profit.In addition,the registration service cost and transaction service cost have a significant impact on the choice of the charging modes by the two platforms:when the registration service cost is not lower than the transaction service cost,the two platforms do not necessarily have a game equilibrium in the selection of the charging modes.If exist,it must be a separating equilibrium,which is one adopts the transaction charging mode while the other adopts the two-part tariff charging mode.On the contrary,the two platforms must have a pooling equilibrium,and both parties will take registration charging mode as the dominant strategy.