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Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions |
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| Authors: | Buckenmaier Johannes Dimant Eugen Posten Ann-Christin Schmidt Ulrich |
| Institution: | 1.University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland ;2.University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA ;3.CESifo, Munich, Germany ;4.University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany ;5.University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland ;6.Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel, Germany ; |
| Abstract: | Journal of Risk and Uncertainty - Economic theory suggests that the deterrence of deviant behavior is driven by a combination of severity and certainty of punishment. This paper presents the first... |
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