基于寻租理论的核电安全监管三方博弈分析

核电作为一种高效清洁能源在全球性的能源危机以及环境问题中得到重视。几次大型核电安全事故,告诫当追求核电经济效益时一定要注重核电的安全发展,走核电安全经济发展道路。中国核电行业安全监管中存在寻租行为,文章运用博弈模型对公众、政府安全监管部门及核电企业三方寻租机制进行分析研究。结果表明,公众监督受到罚款金额和行贿的影响,与惩罚金额呈反比关系,与行贿呈正比关系；政府安全监管部门选择行动概率受到工资、行贿、惩罚金额及监督成本的影响；核电企业行动概率与政府监管部门的工资及惩罚金额相关。

Triangular Game Analysis of Nuclear Safety Supervision Based on Rent-seeking Theory

Nuclear power, as an efficient and clean energy, has attracted close attention in the global energy crisis and environmental problems. Several large-scale nuclear safety accidents warned people that during the pursuit of economic efficiency of nuclear power, people must lay emphasis on the safety of nuclear power development and nuclear power safety is necessary for the economic development. There is rent seeking behavior in the safety supervision of China''s nuclear power industry. In this paper, the game model is applied to analyze the three parties:rent seeking mechanism of the public, the government safety supervision department and the nuclear power enterprise. The results show that the public supervision is affected by fines and bribery.The public supervision is inversely proportional to the amount of punishment, and is proportional to the bribery. Government action selection probability of Safety Supervision Department is influenced by wages, bribery, the amount of punishment and the cost of supervision. The operation probability of the nuclear power enterprise is related to the salary and penalty amount of the government supervision department.