| Abstract: | So, we can argue that the lay public are not fools in their attitudes about risk. That nonexperts should show more concern over hazardous waste facilities in their neighborhoods than radon levels in their homes is not a sign of irrationality (because aggregate and individual risks are greater from the radon), but simply a sign that nonexperts are working from a different set of criteria. These criteria are incorporated in what I call the democratic model. The democratic model evaluates risk based on its social and political consequences, such as possible disruption in the social fabric or a loss of communality. Lay criteria for assessing the impact of risk decisions are not explicit, like the those of the risk analyst, but are embedded in cultural values. Similarly, lay evaluations of risk incorporate substantive and procedural democratic values, such as the acceptability of processes for making decisions, the ethics of the distribution of risk, and the capacity to control a source of risk in the community's interests. Finally, the democratic model relates judgments about risks to the competence (Can we trust them?) and the legitimacy (Should we trust them?) of the social institutions that impose and control those risks. The public's judgments about risk are not inferior, but different, and arguably richer than those of the experts. |
