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EVA基准的经理股票期权激励计划研究
引用本文:张云,郭多祚,徐占东.EVA基准的经理股票期权激励计划研究[J].大连理工大学学报(社会科学版),2004,25(2):47-50.
作者姓名:张云  郭多祚  徐占东
作者单位:1. 大连铁道学院,管理系,辽宁,大连,116029
2. 东北财经大学,数量经济系,辽宁,大连,116023
摘    要:经理股权激励计划在国内外都受到广泛的关注和研究,并且日益成为公司经理激励的主要手段,但现存的经理股票期权激励存在经理人的报酬和公司业绩严重脱节,股东利益受到伤害的问题。为此,设计了一种以EVA为基准的经理股票期权激励计划,力图克服现行经理股票期权激励计划的缺点,并且用实例证明它能够起到理想的激励效果。

关 键 词:经理股票期权(ESO)  经济增加值(EVA)  财富杠杆比率
文章编号:1008-407X(2004)02-0047-04
修稿时间:2004年3月16日

Research on EVO incentive scheme of EVA criterion
ZHANG Yun,GUO Duo-zuo,XU Zhan-dong.Research on EVO incentive scheme of EVA criterion[J].Journal of Dalian University of Technology(Social Sciences),2004,25(2):47-50.
Authors:ZHANG Yun  GUO Duo-zuo  XU Zhan-dong
Abstract:ESO incentive scheme has been paid much attention to and made research for by overseas and domestic people. It's become a primary incentive measure by CEO as well. However, there still exists a problem under the current ESO incentive scheme that the salary of CEO does not correspond with the company's achievements, which badly hurts the shareholder's interests. Thus authors design another different new ESO incentive scheme based on EVA, which can overcome the current scheme's shortcomings and is proved to play an incentive role more effectively by examples.
Keywords:ESO  EVA  FLR( Fortune Lever Ratio)
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