| 现代激励机制与国有企业代理问题 |
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| 引用本文： | 倪志远,谢霄亭.现代激励机制与国有企业代理问题[J].云南民族大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2006,23(4):87-90. |
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| 作者姓名： | 倪志远 谢霄亭 |
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| 作者单位： | 云南民族大学,经济与工商管理学院,云南,昆明,650031 |
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| 摘 要： | 代理问题是两权分离的现代公司制企业共有的特征。对于转制中的我国国有企业,由于体制性诱因,国有企业代理问题更为严重。因此,解决国有企业代理问题的思路是:通过实施现代激励制度,重构国有企业经营者激励约束机制。
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| 关 键 词： | 现代激励机制 代理问题 国企改革 股票期权制 |
| 文章编号： | 1672-867X(2006)04-0087-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年4月14日 |
The Modern Stimulative Mechanism and the Agent Problem of the State-owned Enterprises |
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| NI Zhi-yuan,XIE Xiao-ting.The Modern Stimulative Mechanism and the Agent Problem of the State-owned Enterprises[J].Journal of Yunnan Nationalities University:Social Sciences,2006,23(4):87-90. |
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| Authors: | NI Zhi-yuan XIE Xiao-ting |
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| Abstract: | The agent-related problem is one trait shared by modern companies with a separation of the two rights.Due to the institutional factors in China's state-owned enterprises experiencing the institutional transformation,they face a more serious situation.The possible solution is to reconstruct the mechanism of stimulation and restraint for the managers of the state-owned enterprises by implementing the modern stimulative system. |
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| Keywords: | modern stimulative mechanism agent-related problem reform of the state-owned enterprises stock option |
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