高管薪酬管制、产权性质与双重代理成本

文章以双重代理理论为基础,运用中国上市公司2007-2013年的平衡面板数据对高管薪酬管制的利弊进行分析,并探讨在不同产权性质公司中多元治理主体对薪酬管制的调节效应及其差异.结果表明:薪酬管制利弊并存,表现为对高管在职消费的抑制作用与对大股东防御效应的促进作用;在国有控股公司中,董事会行为对高管薪酬与在职消费的关系具有负向调节效应,机构投资者治理对高管薪酬与大股东防御效应的关系具有负向调节效应;在民营控股公司中,管理层权力对高管薪酬与在职消费的关系具有正向调节效应.因此,理性权衡薪酬管制利弊并有效利用治理主体的制衡作用才是提高薪酬合理性的必要途径.

Executive compensation regulation, ownership nature and dual agency costs

On the basis of dual agent theory, we do research on pros and cons of the executive compensation regulation by using panel data of Chinese listed companies during 2007-2013. Then we discuss the moderate effects of governance bodies and try to find the differences between state-owned and private-owned companies. The results show that if executive payments are restricted, perk level will be inhibited, but entrenchment effect of controlling shareholders will be stimulated. In stated-owned companies, board action has a negative moderate effect on the relationship between compensation and perk, institutional investor has a negative moderate effect on the relationship between compensation and entrenchment effect. In private-owned companies, management power has a positive moderate effect on the relationship between compensation and perk. So it is necessary to weigh the pros and cons of regulation rationally and make effective use of the moderate effects of different governance bodies in order to improve the rationality of executive compensation.