Equivalent comparisons of information channels |
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Authors: | Hiroyuki Nakata |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Royal Holloway College, University of London, Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, UK |
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Abstract: | This article constructs a static model of information acquisition when the agent does not know exactly what pieces of information
he is missing. A representation of preferences over information channels and menus of lotteries is shown by adapting the model
of unforeseen contingencies by Dekel et al. (Econometrica 69:891–934, 2001; Econometrica 75:591–600, 2007), which is an extension
of Kreps (Econometrica 47:565–576, 1979; Economic analysis of markets and games: essays in honor of Frank Hahn, 1992). Also,
characterisation of informativeness of an information channel analogous to the one by Blackwell (Ann Math Stud 24:265–272,
1953) is examined in conjunction with the preference for flexibility by applying the structure of Shapley value. |
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Keywords: | |
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