家族控制、两权分离与债务期限结构选择——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文利用我国2002-2008年家族控制上市公司数据,在控制相关变量下,从债务代理成本视角经验检查在中国债权人法律保护较弱的背景中,终极控制股东(家族)是否影响公司债务期限结构。本文提供的经验证据表明,终极控制股东显著影响公司债务期限结构。具体而言:(1)终极控制股东的控制权越大,公司具有显著低的长期债务水平;(2)终极控制股东的控制权与现金流量权分离度与公司债务期限显著负相关;(3)终极控制股东在上市公司中指派高管与公司债务期限显著负相关。

Family Control,the Voting and Cash-flow Rights Divergence and Debt Maturity: Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

Given the poor creditor rights protection in China,we examine the effects of controlling shareholder moral hazard on debt maturity from the perspective of agency cost of debt,using Chinese family-controlled firm data during 2002-2008.Ceteris paribus,we find strong evidence that the family’s control right and the divergence between the largest ultimate owner’s control rights and cash-flow rights have a negative and significant effect on debt maturity.Moreover,our results suggest that manager appointment by controlling family has a negative and significant effect on debt maturity.