中国式财政分权的数量测度

中国式财政分权并不是严格的法律意义上的分权，而是一种“事实性分权”。选择单一维度的分权指标，无法准确衡量中国式财政分权的程度。本文以1997－2007年中国的省级数据为样本，选取财政收入自治率、财政收入占比、财政支出自决率、财政支出占比、税收管理分权度、行政管理分权度6个指标，对中国式财政分权进行全景式评估；进而，运用基于Bootstrap的Shannon-Spearman测度方法，选择信息损失最小的组合指标作为中国式财政分权的有效衡量指标；最后，应用财政分权衡量指标，检验财政分权与中国经济增长的关系。实证结果显示：中国省级财政分权程度在样本期间呈逐步降低的趋势；中国式财政分权整体上不利于地方经济增长，但不同维度的分权指标对经济增长的影响并不相同。

The Quantitive Measurement of Chinese-style fiscal decentralization

Fiscal decentralization in China is not a strict decentralization in legally, but a kind of de facto decentralization. We can not measure the degree of fiscal decentralization in China accurately by using a single-dimension index. We select six indexes to evaluate China’s fiscal decentralization panoramically. Then we use the Shannon-Spearman Measurement and bootstrap method to choose the composite index with minimum information loss as the valid measure for Chinese-style fiscal decentralization. Finally, we apply these indexes to test the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth in China. Empirical results show: the degree of fiscal decentralization at the provincial level decreased gradually during 1997~2007; Chinese-style fiscal decentralization as a whole was not conducive to local economic growth, but different dimensions of decentralization had different impacts on economic growth.