对多产品销售的激励合同设计及定价研究

在制造商雇用销售商销售多种产品的市场背景下,本文分析了当制造商面临的销售商有关于销售能力的私有信息时,制造商如何制订多种产品的销售价格并设定多产品的激励合同问题。模型中,制造商通过提供多个规定目标销售量的合同供销售商进行选择,在销售商选择后,制造商了解到销售商的真实销售能力。由于制造商和销售商之间存在不对称信息,制造商需要付出一定的信息成本才能获得销售商的销售能力。研究发现,制造商能够通过合适地设定不同产品的销售价格,以获得在不同产品上的分配销售商销售努力的权力。进一步,在一定的条件下制造商可以根据自己的需要任意设定合同中不同产品的目标销售量而不影响其最终期望利润。本文找到了上述最优销售价格以及多种产品目标销售量所需要满足的条件。

Pricing and Compensation on Heterogeneous Sales Forces for Multi-Products under Asymmetric Information

In this paper,we investigate the pricing decision and the compensation strategy of a manufactur er with heterogeneous sales force.The manufacturer hires the sales-agent to sell multi2products.The sales-agent usually has better information of his selling ability than the manufacturer does and he will dis tribute his efforts according to the products.compensation contracts,while the selling ability and effort distribution will both influence the demand.As there is asymmetric information before the manufacturer offers the contracts,the manufacturer has to pay extra cost to get the sales-agent's private information a bout selling ability.And by applying principle-agent theory,we find that the manufacturer can control the agent's effort distribution through setting the optimal prices.