财政分权、政府竞争与企业税负

财政分权通过地方政府的税收竞争与支出竞争影响企业税负，其影响是中性的。利用沪深A股上市公司的面板数据，实证分析了财政分权对企业税负的影响，并考察了这种影响在不同性质企业间的差异。上市公司的税负整体上与财政分权程度呈U型关系，中央企业的所有权属性与企业税负没有显著关系，但地方国企与非国有企业的所有权属性与企业税负显著正相关。东、中、西部地区地方政府的竞争偏好差异，决定了财政分权程度与企业税负的U型关系。长期而言，应建立新型央地财政关系，赋予地方更多税权，合理引导地方政府间的税收竞争；短期而言，改进税制才是降低企业税负的关键。

Fiscal decentralization, local government competition and corporate tax burden

Fiscal decentralization affects the tax burden of corporates through tax competition and expenditure competition of local governments. Using panel data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen, this paper empirically studies the impact of fiscal decentralization on corporate tax burden and examines the difference between enterprises of different nature. On the whole, the tax burden of listed companies has a U-shaped relationship with the degree of fiscal decentralization. There is no significant correlation between the ownership attributes of central enterprises and corporate tax burden, but the ownership attributes of local state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises have a significant positive correlation with corporate tax burden. The difference of competition preferences among local governments in the eastern, central and western regions determines the U-shaped relationship between fiscal decentralization and corporate tax burden. In the long run, a new type of financial relationship between central and local governments should be established to give local governments more tax power and reasonably guide tax competition among local governments; In the short term, improving tax system is the key to reducing corporate tax burden.