On Robust Constitution Design |
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Authors: | Emmanuelle Auriol Robert J Gary-Bobo |
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Institution: | 1.IDEI,Université de Toulouse 1,Toulouse,France;2.Panthéon-Sorbonne Economie and Paris School of Economics,Université Paris 1,Paris cedex 13,France |
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Abstract: | We study a class of representation mechanisms, based on reports made by a random subset of agents, called representatives,
in a collective choice problem with quasi-linear utilities. We do not assume the existence of a common prior probability describing
the distribution of preference types. In addition, there is no benevolent planner. Decisions will be carried out by an individual
who cannot be assumed impartial, a self-interested executive. These assumptions impose new constraints on Mechanism Design.
A robust mechanism is defined as maximizing expected welfare under a vague prior probability distribution, and over a set of mechanisms which
is at the same time immune from opportunistic manipulations by the executive, and compatible with truthful revelation of preferences
by representatives. Robust mechanisms are characterized and their existence is shown. Sampling Groves mechanisms are shown
to be robust.
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Keywords: | collective choice incomplete information mechanism design representative democracy |
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